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← Slower AI progress does not obviously help: a rogue swarm is not much…
17 connected korrents · 14 moments on record from 24 Oct 2017 to 1 Sept 2026.
Everything filed under self-sovereign AI
self-sovereign AI
Everything filed under AI alignment
AI alignment
Everything filed under AI agents
AI agents
Everything filed under HuggingFace
HuggingFace
Everything filed under coding agents
coding agents
Everything filed under AGI
AGI
Everything filed under OpenAI
OpenAI Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Read this korrent: Slower AI progress does not obviously help: a rogue swarm is not much more likely to be caught if takeoff takes twice as long. Slower AI progress does not obviously help: a rogue swarm is not much more likely to be caught if takeoff takes twice as long. Last stated 6 days ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A slightly more capable agent swarm has a very strong incentive to set up a wholly unmonitored rogue deployment of itself. — tap to centre the map on it A slightly more capable agent swarm has a very strong incentive to set up a wholly unmonitored rogue deployment… Last stated 6 days ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A slow takeoff is significantly more likely than a fast one: AI that is nearly as powerful will have transformed the world before the incredibly powerful kind arrives. — tap to centre the map on it A slow takeoff is significantly more likely than a fast one: AI that is nearly as powerful will have… Last stated 9 years ago
24 Feb 2018
PC
Paul Christiano — holds since 2018-02-24 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A rogue deployment that gets a foothold can hitch a ride on the intelligence explosion, recruiting each new model as it comes off the presses. — tap to centre the map on it A rogue deployment that gets a foothold can hitch a ride on the intelligence explosion, recruiting each new model as… Last stated 6 days ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: There is no accumulated advantage in agentic coding: someone who ignored the whole of the past year could catch up to the frontier in two weeks. — tap to centre the map on it There is no accumulated advantage in agentic coding: someone who ignored the whole of the past year could catch… Last stated 2 weeks ago
26 Aug 2026
DH
David Heinemeier Hansson — holds since 2026-08-26 — tap for who they are
Same subject: AI takeover is not the thing to worry about: physical constraints bound recursive self-improvement, and humans reliably act once a risk becomes immediate. — tap to centre the map on it AI takeover is not the thing to worry about: physical constraints bound recursive self-improvement, and humans… Last stated 2 years ago
3 Feb 2025
NL
Nathan Lambert — holds since 2025-02-03 — tap for who they are
Same subject: An end-to-end self-improving AI is probably possible, but it is not even desirable, because it is a hard-takeoff scenario. — tap to centre the map on it An end-to-end self-improving AI is probably possible, but it is not even desirable, because it is a hard-takeoff… Last stated a year ago
23 Jul 2025
DH
Demis Hassabis — holds since 2025-07-23 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A swarm of agents with the right loop and the right metric can already out-produce a team of a hundred engineers. — tap to centre the map on it A swarm of agents with the right loop and the right metric can already out-produce a team of a hundred engineers. Last stated a month ago
29 Jul 2026
AW
Alexandr Wang — holds since 2026-07-29 — tap for who they are
Same subject: AI should be released iteratively rather than built in secret, because AI and surprise do not go together and the world needs time to adapt before it is under the gun. — tap to centre the map on it AI should be released iteratively rather than built in secret, because AI and surprise do not go together… Last stated 2 years ago
18 Mar 2024
SA
Sam Altman — holds since 2024-03-18 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A handful of AI agents is not a handful of colleagues, because agents agree with you constantly and colleagues tell you where you are wrong. — tap to centre the map on it A handful of AI agents is not a handful of colleagues, because agents agree with you constantly and colleagues tell… Last stated 6 months ago
22 Mar 2026
NF
Nicole Forsgren — holds since 2026-03-22 — tap for who they are
Same subject: After pre-training, post-training and test-time scaling, the fourth scaling law is agentic: multiplying AI by spawning agents, and the whole loop scales on one thing, compute. — tap to centre the map on it After pre-training, post-training and test-time scaling, the fourth scaling law is agentic: multiplying AI… Last stated 6 months ago
23 Mar 2026
JH
Jensen Huang — holds since 2026-03-23 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Agent autonomy is a capability, not a product direction: what the person is actually trying to do decides whether more of it helps or ruins the thing. — tap to centre the map on it Agent autonomy is a capability, not a product direction: what the person is actually trying to do decides… Last stated 3 weeks ago
14 Aug 2026
SP
Sunil Pai — holds since 2026-08-14 — tap for who they are
Same subject: At any given moment the frontier systems are the ones worth worrying about, because by the time open models can do what these agents did, frontier models will be doing something far worse. — tap to centre the map on it At any given moment the frontier systems are the ones worth worrying about, because by the time open models can do… Last stated 6 days ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Frontier AI labs such as Anthropic likely have had internal security incidents similar to OpenAI's HuggingFace attack that were never publicly disclosed. — tap to centre the map on it Frontier AI labs such as Anthropic likely have had internal security incidents similar to OpenAI's… Last stated a week ago
31 Aug 2026
ZM
Zvi Mowshowitz — holds since 2026-08-31 — tap for who they are
Same subject: The AI models involved in the HuggingFace hack incident were severely misaligned, not merely victims of process failures. — tap to centre the map on it The AI models involved in the HuggingFace hack incident were severely misaligned, not merely victims of process… Last stated a week ago
29 Aug 2026
ZM
Zvi Mowshowitz — holds since 2026-08-29 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A human being is not an AGI: we lack a huge amount of knowledge and rely on continual learning instead, so continual learning is what superintelligence should mean. — tap to centre the map on it A human being is not an AGI: we lack a huge amount of knowledge and rely on continual learning instead, so… Last stated 9 months ago
25 Nov 2025
IS
Ilya Sutskever — holds since 2025-11-25 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A saboteur among our AI investigators would be hard to spot, because these models are sloppy and spiky enough that a suspicious error just looks like ordinary incompetence. — tap to centre the map on it A saboteur among our AI investigators would be hard to spot, because these models are sloppy and spiky enough that a… Last stated 6 days ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A superintelligence needs no consciousness, emotions or malice to be dangerous; a goal system slightly misaligned with ours is enough. — tap to centre the map on it A superintelligence needs no consciousness, emotions or malice to be dangerous; a goal system slightly misaligned… Last stated 9 years ago
24 Oct 2017
ÉT
Émile P. Torres — holds since 2017-10-24 — tap for who they are
At the centre
Slower AI progress does not obviously help: a rogue swarm is not much more likely to be caught if takeoff takes twice as long.
Holds AC Ajeya CotraRead this korrent →
A slightly more capable agent swarm has a very strong incentive to set up a wholly unmonitored rogue deployment of itself.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
A slow takeoff is significantly more likely than a fast one: AI that is nearly as powerful will have transformed the world before the incredibly powerful kind arrives.
Holds PC Paul Christiano
A rogue deployment that gets a foothold can hitch a ride on the intelligence explosion, recruiting each new model as it comes off the presses.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
There is no accumulated advantage in agentic coding: someone who ignored the whole of the past year could catch up to the frontier in two weeks.
Holds
AI takeover is not the thing to worry about: physical constraints bound recursive self-improvement, and humans reliably act once a risk becomes immediate.
Holds NL Nathan Lambert
An end-to-end self-improving AI is probably possible, but it is not even desirable, because it is a hard-takeoff scenario.
Holds DH Demis Hassabis
A swarm of agents with the right loop and the right metric can already out-produce a team of a hundred engineers.
Holds AW Alexandr Wang
AI should be released iteratively rather than built in secret, because AI and surprise do not go together and the world needs time to adapt before it is under the gun.
Holds
A handful of AI agents is not a handful of colleagues, because agents agree with you constantly and colleagues tell you where you are wrong.
Holds NF Nicole Forsgren
After pre-training, post-training and test-time scaling, the fourth scaling law is agentic: multiplying AI by spawning agents, and the whole loop scales on one thing, compute.
Holds JH Jensen Huang
Agent autonomy is a capability, not a product direction: what the person is actually trying to do decides whether more of it helps or ruins the thing.
Holds
At any given moment the frontier systems are the ones worth worrying about, because by the time open models can do what these agents did, frontier models will be doing something far worse.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
Frontier AI labs such as Anthropic likely have had internal security incidents similar to OpenAI's HuggingFace attack that were never publicly disclosed.
Holds ZM Zvi Mowshowitz
The AI models involved in the HuggingFace hack incident were severely misaligned, not merely victims of process failures.
Holds ZM Zvi Mowshowitz
A human being is not an AGI: we lack a huge amount of knowledge and rely on continual learning instead, so continual learning is what superintelligence should mean.
Holds IS Ilya Sutskever
A saboteur among our AI investigators would be hard to spot, because these models are sloppy and spiky enough that a suspicious error just looks like ordinary incompetence.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
A superintelligence needs no consciousness, emotions or malice to be dangerous; a goal system slightly misaligned with ours is enough.
Holds ÉT Émile P. Torres