Wayne Hale
Retired NASA engineer and manager, a Space Shuttle flight director for forty missions and Space Shuttle Program Manager or Deputy for five years. Writes about risk, engineering judgement and the Columbia accident at waynehale.wordpress.com.
Wayne Hale did not write this page.
We collected these quotes from things they published elsewhere, and every quote links to where it was said. They have no account here and have not endorsed this site. Quotes are word for word; the short line under each one is our own restatement, not their wording. Their own site. Is this you? Claim it or ask us to remove it. Or tell us what is wrong here.
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Their wordsBefore getting too far, remember this constant in space flight: it is not safe by any ordinary consideration of safety.
↗Flight Rationalewaynehale.wordpress.com 1st of 3 in this piece
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Their wordsAlways take the determination of ‘root cause’ with a grain of salt.
↗Flight Rationalewaynehale.wordpress.com 2nd of 3 in this piece
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Their wordsThe engineers will always always always ask for more tests, more analysis, more time to get more information to be more certain of their conclusions.
↗Flight Rationalewaynehale.wordpress.com 3rd of 3 in this piece
- 5 years earlier
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Their wordsTemptation is very high to wave away issues, ignore anomalies, squeeze the rules, or brush aside inconsistencies just to GET ON WITH IT.
- 4 years earlier
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Their wordsThe ‘horizon goal’ isn’t Mars, it is the entire solar system.
↗Manifest Destiny or Pipe Dream?waynehale.wordpress.com 1st of 2 in this piece
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Their wordsWhen we have built colonies on every habitable niche, then maybe we will find a way to go to the stars.
↗Manifest Destiny or Pipe Dream?waynehale.wordpress.com 2nd of 2 in this piece
- 20 months earlier
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Their wordsDefer to expertise rather than leaders.
↗After Ten Years: Enduring Lessonswaynehale.wordpress.com 2nd of 4 in this piece
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Our reading
A team that agrees has not examined the problem hard enough; dissent is what makes a decision safe.
Their wordsIf you don’t have dissention, then you haven’t examined the problem closely enough.
↗After Ten Years: Enduring Lessonswaynehale.wordpress.com 3rd of 4 in this piece
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Their wordsWe were told that flying in the space shuttle was just as safe as flying in a commercial airliner, so we denied the crew parachutes and pressure suits.
↗After Ten Years: Enduring Lessonswaynehale.wordpress.com 4th of 4 in this piece
- 3 weeks earlier
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Their wordsSo all the discussion in the accident report about the flaws in the tile analysis are simply not applicable.
↗After Ten Years: Working on the Wrong Problemwaynehale.wordpress.com 1st of 2 in this piece
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Their wordsSo don’t blame an individual; looks for the organizational factors that lead to that kind of a mindset.
↗After Ten Years: Working on the Wrong Problemwaynehale.wordpress.com 2nd of 2 in this piece