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Wayne Hale

What Wayne Hale thinks about space

@wayne-hale · 11 positions · 1 change of mind

Retired NASA engineer and manager, a Space Shuttle flight director for forty missions and Space Shuttle Program Manager or Deputy for five years. Writes about risk, engineering judgement and the Columbia accident at waynehale.wordpress.com.

Wayne Hale did not write this page.

We collected these quotes from things they published elsewhere, and every quote links to where it was said. They have no account here and have not endorsed this site. Quotes are word for word; the short line under each one is our own restatement, not their wording. Their own site. Is this you? Claim it or ask us to remove it. Or tell us what is wrong here.

4 dated positions, 2013 to 2024, in their own words. Our reading of what Wayne Hale has said — not written or endorsed by them.

4 positions so far — this page is not yet offered to search engines.

  1. Our readingSpaceflight is not safe by any ordinary standard of safety, and pretending otherwise is what kills crews.

    Their wordsBefore getting too far, remember this constant in space flight: it is not safe by any ordinary consideration of safety.

    ↗Flight Rationalewaynehale.wordpress.com 1st of 3 in this piece

  2. 10 years earlier

  3. Our readingExtending consciousness beyond Earth, out to the stars, is a fundamentally good goal.

    consciousness

    Their wordsWhen we have built colonies on every habitable niche, then maybe we will find a way to go to the stars.

    ↗Manifest Destiny or Pipe Dream?waynehale.wordpress.com 2nd of 2 in this piece

  4. 20 months earlier

  5. Our readingNASA denied Shuttle crews parachutes and pressure suits because it had convinced itself the vehicle was as safe as an airliner.

    Their wordsWe were told that flying in the space shuttle was just as safe as flying in a commercial airliner, so we denied the crew parachutes and pressure suits.

    ↗After Ten Years: Enduring Lessonswaynehale.wordpress.com 4th of 4 in this piece

  6. 3 weeks earlier

  7. Our readingThe Columbia investigation focused on the wrong part of the wing: the engineers were analysing tiles when the damage was to the leading edge.

    Their wordsSo all the discussion in the accident report about the flaws in the tile analysis are simply not applicable.

    ↗After Ten Years: Working on the Wrong Problemwaynehale.wordpress.com 1st of 2 in this piece