What Matthew Green thinks about Telegram
Cryptographer and professor at Johns Hopkins University, where he works on applied cryptography and user privacy. He writes A Few Thoughts on Cryptographic Engineering, which is where most public arguments about messaging encryption, client-side scanning and cloud backup end up being adjudicated.
Matthew Green did not write this page.
We collected these quotes from things they published elsewhere, and every quote links to where it was said. They have no account here and have not endorsed this site. Quotes are word for word; the short line under each one is our own restatement, not their wording. Their own site. Is this you? Claim it or ask us to remove it. Or tell us what is wrong here.
3 dated positions, 2024, in their own words. Our reading of what Matthew Green has said — not written or endorsed by them.
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Their wordsTelegram clearly fails to meet this stronger definition for a simple reason: it does not end-to-end encrypt conversations by default.
↗Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?blog.cryptographyengineering.com 1st of 4 in this piece
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Our readingAlmost every one-to-one Telegram chat, and every group chat, is readable on Telegram’s own servers.
Their wordsThe practical impact is that the vast majority of one-on-one Telegram conversations — and literally every single group chat — are probably visible on Telegram’s servers, which can see and record the content of all messages sent between users.
↗Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?blog.cryptographyengineering.com 2nd of 4 in this piece
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Their wordsIndeed, it no longer feels amusing to see the Telegram organization urge people away from default-encrypted messengers, while refusing to implement essential features that would widely encrypt their own users’ messages.
↗Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?blog.cryptographyengineering.com 3rd of 4 in this piece