korrents

What Matthew Green thinks about privacy

@matthew-green · 11 positions · 0 changes of mind

Cryptographer and professor at Johns Hopkins University, where he works on applied cryptography and user privacy. He writes A Few Thoughts on Cryptographic Engineering, which is where most public arguments about messaging encryption, client-side scanning and cloud backup end up being adjudicated.

Matthew Green did not write this page.

We collected these quotes from things they published elsewhere, and every quote links to where it was said. They have no account here and have not endorsed this site. Quotes are word for word; the short line under each one is our own restatement, not their wording. Their own site. Is this you? Claim it or ask us to remove it. Or tell us what is wrong here.

7 dated positions, 2021 to 2024, in their own words. Our reading of what Matthew Green has said — not written or endorsed by them.

  1. Our readingTelegram is not an encrypted messenger in the sense that matters, because it does not end-to-end encrypt conversations by default.

    Their wordsTelegram clearly fails to meet this stronger definition for a simple reason: it does not end-to-end encrypt conversations by default.

    ↗Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?blog.cryptographyengineering.com 1st of 4 in this piece

    Telegram

    Interesting

  3. Our readingTelegram urges people away from default-encrypted messengers while refusing to build the features that would encrypt its own users.

    Their wordsIndeed, it no longer feels amusing to see the Telegram organization urge people away from default-encrypted messengers, while refusing to implement essential features that would widely encrypt their own users’ messages.

    ↗Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?blog.cryptographyengineering.com 3rd of 4 in this piece

    Telegram

    Interesting

  5. Our readingEncryption people have to switch on protects almost nobody; what protects people is what a service turns on for everyone.

    Their wordsTo be honest though, it doesn’t matter how secure something is if people aren’t actually using it.

    ↗Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?blog.cryptographyengineering.com 4th of 4 in this piece

    Interesting
  6. 21 months earlier

  7. Our readingDefault cloud backup has quietly put a copy of nearly everyone’s private papers in a few data centres, and that is a surveillance weapon.

    Their wordsIt terrifies me, because these data repositories are not only a risk to individual user privacy, they’re effectively a surveillance super-weapon.

    ↗Why encrypted backup is so importantblog.cryptographyengineering.com 2nd of 2 in this piece

    data centers

    Interesting
  8. 16 months earlier

  9. Our readingA tracing requirement in an encrypted messenger gives up the confidentiality of who sent what, which is the part that protects the sender.

    Their wordsIn short: traceability can really screw with the “who sent what” side of content confidentiality.

    ↗Thinking about “traceability”blog.cryptographyengineering.com 1st of 3 in this piece

    Interesting

  11. Our readingWho sent what is not metadata, so an encrypted system that reveals it has given up more than the routing information it could never hide.

    Their wordsInformation revealed about “who sent what” in an E2E system is not the same as metadata.

    ↗Thinking about “traceability”blog.cryptographyengineering.com 2nd of 3 in this piece

    Interesting
  12. 12 days earlier

  13. Our readingWhat made NSO different was not its exploits but its scale: it turned state-grade surveillance into something any government could buy.

    Their wordsRather: NSO’s genius is that they’ve done something that attackers were never incentivized to do in this past: democratize access to exploit technology.

    ↗A case against security nihilismblog.cryptographyengineering.com 2nd of 2 in this piece

    government

    Interesting