16 korrents from this recording
Every claim below is a statement made in this recording, quoted word for word and linked to the second it was said, so you can hear it rather than take our word for it. The wording comes from the transcript published alongside the recording; the sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording.
0:06:46 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsWhat blocks insight is that organizations say they want insights and they want innovation and they really don't. But they're they're being serious. They think they want insights. But insights are disorganizing.
0:16:12 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsSo, experts are highly aware of mistakes. But people who are journeymen, many of them stay as journeymen because they they want to move on and forget about their mistakes.
0:21:32 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsI may have I may be an investor. I have a track record of calling the market right in the last five times. People say, "Wow, he really knows what he's talking about." But there are lots of people who are trying to predict which way the market is going to go. And some of them are going to get it right by chance. And people assume it's because they know what they're what they're doing, and in fact they're just the lucky ones.
0:25:07 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsNow, some decisions may have been good decisions that didn't work through no fault of the employee. And some may have been bad decisions that worked because the employee got lucky. So, you can't just look at the outcome, but you have to look at what What was the person thinking about when they made the decision?
0:38:55 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsBut the researchers who have investigated this find that scientists do the same thing. They have something that's called knowledge shields, the way all of us do, that that a a a variety of techniques for explaining away inconvenient data and anomalies. But what we're effectively doing is we're holding on to our story.
0:40:47 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsSo we we want people, that's the way we break out of fixation, is we notice the anomalies. The way we get stuck in fixation and making fixation errors is we explain away the anomalies, hold on to the original wrong impression until it's far too late.
0:43:16 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordspeople get up to a certain level of performance, and then they start to stagnate. And they start to plateau. And people who who break through and move to the next level um are the ones who have to who engage in unlearning. Who realize there are certain uh conventions they've bought into or beliefs they hold that are either wrong or are limited and and don't apply as broadly as as they imagine.
0:59:45 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsOne of the mistakes is that they just frame it wrong from the beginning. They'll say, "Okay, we should do a pre-mortem. So, what can go wrong?" It's not an issue of what can go wrong. We're dealing with a crystal ball that has showed that the plan has failed. We know that it failed. And our job is is to explain why. So, saying what can go wrong is too tentative. It's too vague.
1:02:20 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsI don't like the idea of decision biases. I know my sense of the literature is that there's been little if any success in debiasing people. And I think that's a good thing. Because the biases that get identified are essentially related to the heuristics that we've learned and are part of the experience that we have. And they only look like biases in hindsight once one of them doesn't work.
1:03:25 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsUm but nobody has done research on the positive side of these heuristics. And so, I think that's a bias on the part of the decision bias researchers that they're only looking at the down arrow. How do these heuristics get us in trouble? And they're not looking at the strength of these heuristics.
1:06:39 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsBut their lives became miserable. It would take them 45 minutes to decide what restaurant to go through. They got divorced. They lost their jobs because they could not use their emotions because our emotions are a way of drawing on on the patterns we've built and on our experiences.
1:13:26 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsI have problems with group decisions. I think groups as a rule like a heuristic make terrible decisions. Individuals should make decisions. Groups should provide input. Um but there should be one sort of person making the decision.
1:15:36 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsthe research on like brainstorming where all brainstorming together the research shows that brainstorming does not produce more ideas or more innovative ideas. And I think teams would be and groups would be better having individuals generate their own concepts and then after they've done it independently and privately sharing it with the others.
1:23:13 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsAnd we get to this point, these are the hardest decisions people ever wrestle with. And the paradox is if the advantages and disadvantages of the two options are almost perfectly balanced, it doesn't matter which one we pick. And yet we will spend days and weeks going around in a funk, which one am I going to choose?
1:24:59 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsin 1985, um my colleagues and I came up with a description of how people actually make life-and-death decisions under extreme time pressure and certainty. And we called it the recognition prime decision model. And it's a blend of intuition plus analysis. And we found we studied firefighters. We found that most fire that accounted for almost 90% of the tough decisions firefighters made.
1:26:09 · watch on youtube.com↗
Their wordsWhat we could we could train people by saying, "Here's the recognition prime decision model. Now, you know, follow this." And that would be useless. Because of uh telling people the strategy isn't going to buy them anything. The intuition part is a reflection of the patterns they've built up through experience. And so there's no shortcut for that.