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William MacAskill

@william-macaskill · 7 positions · 0 changes of mind

Philosopher at Oxford who co-founded Giving What We Can, 80,000 Hours and the Centre for Effective Altruism, and who named effective altruism. Author of Doing Good Better and What We Owe the Future; now writes at Forethought.

William MacAskill did not write this page.

We collected these quotes from things they published elsewhere, and every quote links to where it was said. They have no account here and have not endorsed this site. Quotes are word for word; the short line under each one is our own restatement, not their wording. Their own site. Is this you? Claim it or ask us to remove it. Or tell us what is wrong here.

  1. Our reading

    Avoiding catastrophe is not enough, because a future in which humanity survives can still fall far short of what was possible.

    Their wordsOn this view, it’s not enough to avoid near-term catastrophe, because the future could still fall far short of what’s possible.

    ↗Introducing Better Futuresforethought.org 1st of 7 in this piece

    Interesting

  3. Our reading

    Improving how good the future turns out to be, given that humanity survives, is roughly as high a priority as preventing extinction.

    Their wordsThis essay series will argue that work on Flourishing is in the same ballpark of priority as work on Surviving.

    ↗Introducing Better Futuresforethought.org 2nd of 7 in this piece

    Interesting

  5. Our reading

    A common-sense utopia is much closer to the present day than it is to the best futures actually available to us.

    Their wordsBut the difference in value between the world today and that common-sense utopia might be very small compared to the difference between that common-sense utopia and the best futures we could feasibly achieve.

    ↗Introducing Better Futuresforethought.org 3rd of 7 in this piece

    Interesting

  7. Our reading

    Whether anyone can actually do anything about how good the future is, rather than whether it matters, is the strongest objection to prioritising it.

    Their wordsI see this as the strongest argument against the better futures perspective, and the reason why I don’t feel confident that work on Flourishing is higher-priority than work on Surviving, rather than merely in the same ballpark.

    ↗Introducing Better Futuresforethought.org 4th of 7 in this piece

    Interesting

  9. Our reading

    Working on how good the long-run future is does not require accepting consequentialism or believing that you should always maximise the good.

    Their wordsBut I don’t claim you should always maximize the good, no matter the self-sacrifice, and no matter what means are involved.

    ↗Introducing Better Futuresforethought.org 5th of 7 in this piece

    Interesting

  11. Our reading

    We should act on the assumption that we have almost no idea what the best futures would look like, so committing today to any particular vision would be a great mistake.

    Their wordsGiven how much moral progress we should hope to make in the future, and how much we’ll learn about what’s even empirically possible, we should act on the assumption that we have almost no idea what the best feasible futures would look like. Committing today to some particular vision would be a great mistake.

    ↗Introducing Better Futuresforethought.org 6th of 7 in this piece

    Interesting

  13. Our reading

    The near-term goal should be a state of the world that can steer itself towards good outcomes, not any particular end state.

    Their wordsFrom my point of view, the key priority in the world today is to get us closer to viatopia, not to some particular narrow end-state.

    ↗Introducing Better Futuresforethought.org 7th of 7 in this piece

    Interesting