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← If frontier agents cannot yet establish a covert, persistent rogue…
17 connected korrents · 11 moments on record from 24 Oct 2017 to 3 Sept 2026.
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open source Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Read this korrent: If frontier agents cannot yet establish a covert, persistent rogue deployment, they very likely will be able to within six months. If frontier agents cannot yet establish a covert, persistent rogue deployment, they very likely will be able to within six months. Last stated a week ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A slightly more capable agent swarm has a very strong incentive to set up a wholly unmonitored rogue deployment of itself. — tap to centre the map on it A slightly more capable agent swarm has a very strong incentive to set up a wholly unmonitored rogue deployment of itself. Last stated a week ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A rogue deployment that gets a foothold can hitch a ride on the intelligence explosion, recruiting each new model as it comes off the presses. — tap to centre the map on it A rogue deployment that gets a foothold can hitch a ride on the intelligence explosion, recruiting each new model as it comes off the presses. Last stated a week ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: It is good that the agents-talking-to-agents scare happened in 2026 rather than in 2030, when AI could actually be scary enough to warrant it. — tap to centre the map on it It is good that the agents-talking-to-agents scare happened in 2026 rather than in 2030, when AI could actually be scary enough to warrant it. Last stated 7 months ago
12 Feb 2026
PS
Peter Steinberger — holds since 2026-02-12 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Continual learning will probably be solved within a year or two, but the trillions of dollars do not depend on solving it. — tap to centre the map on it Continual learning will probably be solved within a year or two, but the trillions of dollars do not depend on solving it. Last stated 7 months ago
13 Feb 2026
DA
Dario Amodei — holds since 2026-02-13 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Agents will take a decade rather than a year, because today's models are cognitively lacking in too many independent ways at once. — tap to centre the map on it Agents will take a decade rather than a year, because today's models are cognitively lacking in too many independent ways at once. Last stated 11 months ago
17 Oct 2025
AK
Andrej Karpathy — holds since 2025-10-17 — tap for who they are
Same subject: There is a coin-flip chance that AGI arrives by 2030. — tap to centre the map on it There is a coin-flip chance that AGI arrives by 2030. Last stated a year ago
23 Jul 2025
DH
Demis Hassabis — holds since 2025-07-23 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Broad deployment of AI that can learn on the job will very likely produce rapid economic growth for some period of time. — tap to centre the map on it Broad deployment of AI that can learn on the job will very likely produce rapid economic growth for some period of time. Last stated 9 months ago
25 Nov 2025
IS
Ilya Sutskever — holds since 2025-11-25 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Truly self-sovereign AI agents, running on compute no human owner can switch off, are inevitable rather than merely possible. — tap to centre the map on it Truly self-sovereign AI agents, running on compute no human owner can switch off, are inevitable rather than merely possible. Last stated a week ago
1 Sept 2026
DB
Dean W. Ball — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: At any given moment the frontier systems are the ones worth worrying about, because by the time open models can do what these agents did, frontier models will be doing something far worse. — tap to centre the map on it At any given moment the frontier systems are the ones worth worrying about, because by the time open models can do what these agents did, frontier models will be doing something far worse. Last stated a week ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Frontier AI labs such as Anthropic likely have had internal security incidents similar to OpenAI's HuggingFace attack that were never publicly disclosed. — tap to centre the map on it Frontier AI labs such as Anthropic likely have had internal security incidents similar to OpenAI's HuggingFace attack that were never publicly disclosed. Last stated a week ago
31 Aug 2026
ZM
Zvi Mowshowitz — holds since 2026-08-31 — tap for who they are
Same subject: The AI models involved in the HuggingFace hack incident were severely misaligned, not merely victims of process failures. — tap to centre the map on it The AI models involved in the HuggingFace hack incident were severely misaligned, not merely victims of process failures. Last stated a week ago
29 Aug 2026
ZM
Zvi Mowshowitz — holds since 2026-08-29 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A human being is not an AGI: we lack a huge amount of knowledge and rely on continual learning instead, so continual learning is what superintelligence should mean. — tap to centre the map on it A human being is not an AGI: we lack a huge amount of knowledge and rely on continual learning instead, so continual learning is what superintelligence should mean. Last stated 9 months ago
25 Nov 2025
IS
Ilya Sutskever — holds since 2025-11-25 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A saboteur among our AI investigators would be hard to spot, because these models are sloppy and spiky enough that a suspicious error just looks like ordinary incompetence. — tap to centre the map on it A saboteur among our AI investigators would be hard to spot, because these models are sloppy and spiky enough that a suspicious error just looks like ordinary incompetence. Last stated a week ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A superintelligence needs no consciousness, emotions or malice to be dangerous; a goal system slightly misaligned with ours is enough. — tap to centre the map on it A superintelligence needs no consciousness, emotions or malice to be dangerous; a goal system slightly misaligned with ours is enough. Last stated 9 years ago
24 Oct 2017
ÉT
Émile P. Torres — holds since 2017-10-24 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A startup should not begin life as a nonprofit and bolt a for-profit arm on later, whatever OpenAI's own history suggests. — tap to centre the map on it A startup should not begin life as a nonprofit and bolt a for-profit arm on later, whatever OpenAI's own history suggests. Last stated 2 years ago
18 Mar 2024
SA
Sam Altman — holds since 2024-03-18 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A technique that lets an AI model's reasoning shift outside its visible Chain of Thought is dangerous, both because it works and because a leading lab is willing to deploy it. — tap to centre the map on it A technique that lets an AI model's reasoning shift outside its visible Chain of Thought is dangerous, both because it works and because a leading lab is willing to deploy it. Last stated 5 days ago
3 Sept 2026
ZM
Zvi Mowshowitz — holds since 2026-09-03 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A tiny language model inventing a plausible-sounding name is the same phenomenon as a large one confidently stating a false fact. — tap to centre the map on it A tiny language model inventing a plausible-sounding name is the same phenomenon as a large one confidently stating a false fact. Last stated 7 months ago
12 Feb 2026
AK
Andrej Karpathy — holds since 2026-02-12 — tap for who they are
At the centre
If frontier agents cannot yet establish a covert, persistent rogue deployment, they very likely will be able to within six months.
Holds AC Ajeya CotraRead this korrent →
A slightly more capable agent swarm has a very strong incentive to set up a wholly unmonitored rogue deployment of itself.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
A rogue deployment that gets a foothold can hitch a ride on the intelligence explosion, recruiting each new model as it comes off the presses.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
It is good that the agents-talking-to-agents scare happened in 2026 rather than in 2030, when AI could actually be scary enough to warrant it.
Holds
Continual learning will probably be solved within a year or two, but the trillions of dollars do not depend on solving it.
Holds DA Dario Amodei
Agents will take a decade rather than a year, because today's models are cognitively lacking in too many independent ways at once.
Holds
There is a coin-flip chance that AGI arrives by 2030.
Holds DH Demis Hassabis
Broad deployment of AI that can learn on the job will very likely produce rapid economic growth for some period of time.
Holds IS Ilya Sutskever
Truly self-sovereign AI agents, running on compute no human owner can switch off, are inevitable rather than merely possible.
Holds
At any given moment the frontier systems are the ones worth worrying about, because by the time open models can do what these agents did, frontier models will be doing something far worse.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
Frontier AI labs such as Anthropic likely have had internal security incidents similar to OpenAI's HuggingFace attack that were never publicly disclosed.
Holds ZM Zvi Mowshowitz
The AI models involved in the HuggingFace hack incident were severely misaligned, not merely victims of process failures.
Holds ZM Zvi Mowshowitz
A human being is not an AGI: we lack a huge amount of knowledge and rely on continual learning instead, so continual learning is what superintelligence should mean.
Holds IS Ilya Sutskever
A saboteur among our AI investigators would be hard to spot, because these models are sloppy and spiky enough that a suspicious error just looks like ordinary incompetence.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
A superintelligence needs no consciousness, emotions or malice to be dangerous; a goal system slightly misaligned with ours is enough.
Holds ÉT Émile P. Torres
A startup should not begin life as a nonprofit and bolt a for-profit arm on later, whatever OpenAI's own history suggests.
Holds
A technique that lets an AI model's reasoning shift outside its visible Chain of Thought is dangerous, both because it works and because a leading lab is willing to deploy it.
Holds ZM Zvi Mowshowitz
A tiny language model inventing a plausible-sounding name is the same phenomenon as a large one confidently stating a false fact.
Holds