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Kevin Esvelt

@kevin-esvelt · 6 positions · 0 changes of mind

Evolutionary and ecological engineer, professor at the MIT Media Lab, where he leads the Sculpting Evolution group. He first described CRISPR-based gene drives and then argued publicly for constraining them; he now works mainly on biosecurity - DNA synthesis screening, pathogen-agnostic early detection, and keeping pandemic-capable sequences out of circulation.

Kevin Esvelt did not write this page.

We collected these quotes from things they published elsewhere, and every quote links to where it was said. They have no account here and have not endorsed this site. Quotes are word for word; the short line under each one is our own restatement, not their wording. Their own site. Is this you? Claim it or ask us to remove it. Or tell us what is wrong here.

  1. Our reading

    Ordering the synthetic DNA needed to rebuild the 1918 influenza virus is surprisingly easy, even from companies that screen customers' orders.

    Their wordsIt should be hard — exceedingly hard — to obtain the synthetic DNA needed to recreate the virus that caused the deadly 1918 influenza pandemic without authorization. But my lab found that it’s surprisingly easy, even when ordering gene fragments from companies that check customers’ orders to detect hazardous sequences.

    ↗It shouldn't be easy to buy synthetic DNA fragments to recreate the 1918 flu virusmedia.mit.edu 1st of 4 in this piece

    Interesting

  3. Our reading

    The tools that make biology powerful for medicine are the same tools that make it dangerous, so the benefits and the misuse risk cannot be separated.

    Their wordsOur experiment demonstrates that the immense potential benefits of biotechnology are profoundly vulnerable to misuse.

    ↗It shouldn't be easy to buy synthetic DNA fragments to recreate the 1918 flu virusmedia.mit.edu 2nd of 4 in this piece

    Interesting

  5. Our reading

    The genome sequences of pandemic viruses and the protocols for building them from synthetic DNA are already freely available online.

    Their wordsBoth the genome sequences of pandemic viruses and step-by-step protocols to make infectious samples from synthetic DNA are now freely available online.

    ↗It shouldn't be easy to buy synthetic DNA fragments to recreate the 1918 flu virusmedia.mit.edu 3rd of 4 in this piece

    Interesting

  7. Our reading

    Every synthetic DNA order should be screened for hazardous sequences and shipped only to researchers whose work a biosafety authority has approved.

    Their wordsThat makes it essential to ensure that all synthetic DNA orders are screened to determine whether they contain hazardous sequences, which should be shipped only to legitimate researchers whose work has been approved by a biosafety authority.

    ↗It shouldn't be easy to buy synthetic DNA fragments to recreate the 1918 flu virusmedia.mit.edu 4th of 4 in this piece

    Interesting
  8. 3 years earlier

  9. Our reading

    Research programmes that identify or create pandemic-capable viruses teach the world how to make them, and should stop.

    Their wordsBut perhaps the biggest question of all isn’t being asked insistently enough: Why is anyone trying to teach the world how to make viruses that could kill millions of people?

    ↗Opinion: Manipulating viruses and risking pandemics is too dangerous. It's time to stop.media.mit.edu 1st of 2 in this piece

    Interesting

  11. Our reading

    The spread of pandemic-capable biology should be treated as a matter of international security, in the way nuclear physics is.

    Their wordsLike nuclear physics, with its potential for global catastrophe when put to destructive ends, the proliferation of pandemic biology ought to be considered a matter of international security.

    ↗Opinion: Manipulating viruses and risking pandemics is too dangerous. It's time to stop.media.mit.edu 2nd of 2 in this piece

    physics

    Interesting