What Karl Popper thinks about metascience

@karl-popper · 17 positions · On ppll ↗

Austrian-British philosopher of science (1902 to 1994), professor at the London School of Economics; author of The Logic of Scientific Discovery and The Open Society and Its Enemies.

Karl Popper did not write this page.

We collected these quotes from things they published elsewhere, and every quote links to where it was said. They have no account here and have not endorsed this site. Quotes are word for word; the short line under each one is our own restatement, not their wording. Their own site. Is this you? Claim it or ask us to remove it. Or tell us what is wrong here.

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Only Karl Popper on metascience. See everyone on metascience

8 dated positions, c. 1963–1968, in their own words. Our reading of what Karl Popper has said — not written or endorsed by them.

1. c. 1963–1968

   Our readingConfirmations are easy to find for nearly any theory if we look for them

   Their wordsIt is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory - if we look for confirmations.

   ↗Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics, 2002 edition)books.google.com All 17 from this book

3. c. 1963–1968

   Our readingConfirmations should count only when they come from risky predictions

   Their wordsConfirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions

   ↗Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics, 2002 edition)books.google.com All 17 from this book

5. c. 1963–1968

   Our readingThe more a scientific theory forbids, the better it is

   Their wordsThe more a theory forbids, the better it is.

   ↗Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics, 2002 edition)books.google.com All 17 from this book

7. c. 1963–1968

   Our readingBeing irrefutable is not a virtue in a theory but a vice

   Their wordsIrrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.

   ↗Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics, 2002 edition)books.google.com All 17 from this book

9. c. 1963–1968

   Our readingEvery genuine test of a theory is an attempt to refute it

   Their wordsEvery genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability

   ↗Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics, 2002 edition)books.google.com All 17 from this book

11. c. 1963–1968

    Our readingObservation is always selective

    Their wordsObservation is always selective.

    ↗Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics, 2002 edition)books.google.com All 17 from this book

13. c. 1963–1968

    Our readingRationality is the critical attitude: freely discussing theories to find their weak spots so they can be improved

    Their wordsThe critical attitude, the tradition of free discussion of theories with the aim of discovering their weak spots so that they may be improved upon, is the attitude of reasonableness, of rationality.

    ↗Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics, 2002 edition)books.google.com All 17 from this book

15. c. 1963–1968

    Our readingFalse theories often serve well enough: formulae known to be false can be excellent approximations

    Their wordsfalse theories often serve well enough: most formulae used in engineering or navigation are known to be false, although they may be excellent approximations and easy to handle

    ↗Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics, 2002 edition)books.google.com All 17 from this book