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Bret Devereaux

What Bret Devereaux thinks about war

@bret-devereaux · 25 positions · 0 changes of mind

Ancient and military historian specialising in the economy of the ancient Mediterranean, who writes the long-form blog A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry on pre-modern economies, logistics and warfare, and on what popular history, film and games get wrong about them.

Bret Devereaux did not write this page.

We collected these quotes from things they published elsewhere, and every quote links to where it was said. They have no account here and have not endorsed this site. Quotes are word for word; the short line under each one is our own restatement, not their wording. Their own site. Is this you? Claim it or ask us to remove it. Or tell us what is wrong here.

4 dated positions, 2020 to 2022, in their own words. Our reading of what Bret Devereaux has said — not written or endorsed by them.

4 positions so far — this page is not yet offered to search engines.

  1. Our readingAbout six weeks of supply is the most a pre-railway army could buy itself by adding carrying capacity, however many wagons it brought.

    Their wordsSo there are sharp limits to how much extra range an army can get by adding carrying capacity; in practice about a month and a half’s logistics buffer is the maximum that’s possible and even doing that is expensive.

    ↗Collections: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problemacoup.blog 1st of 3 in this piece

  3. Our readingBefore railways an army could not carry the food it needed: anything longer than a few days in the field forced it to live off the country it was in.

    Their wordsThe tyranny of the wagon equation is thus inescapable: an army that plans to be in the field for more than just a few days cannot bring all of the food it needs with it; it must find most of its food locally.

    ↗Collections: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problemacoup.blog 2nd of 3 in this piece

  5. Our readingThe binding constraint on pre-modern campaigning was feeding the army every day it was in the field, not winning the battle at the end of it.

    Their wordsIn order to move this army or sustain it in place it is thus necessary to ensure a massive and relatively continuous supply of food to the army. Failure to do that will result in the army falling apart long before it comes anywhere close to the enemy.

    ↗Collections: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problemacoup.blog 3rd of 3 in this piece

  6. 2 years earlier

  7. Our readingHard peoples from harsh places are not better at war: at the dawn of civilisation it was the softest and richest societies that won most often.

    Their wordsAnd it is quite clear from that evidence, that at the dawn of civilization, it was the least Fremen societies who tended to win the most.

    ↗Collections: The Fremen Mirage, Part I: War at the Dawn of Civilizationacoup.blog 2nd of 2 in this piece