The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Book III (tr. Andrew Motte, 1729; 1846 edition)

Isaac Newton · c. 1713–1726

Isaac Newton did not write this page.

Every claim below was made in this book, quoted word for word and numbered in the order the piece makes them, so you can read it there rather than take our word for it. The book prints chapter headings its extracted text does not preserve, so the claims below are in the book's order but not grouped. The sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording. Each quote was checked against a stored copy of the page at build time; where the two differ, the quote is the fact.

Our reading
Admit no more causes of natural things than are both true and sufficient to explain them

Their wordsWe are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
Our reading
Nature is pleased with simplicity and has no use for superfluous causes

Their wordsTo this purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes.
Our reading
The same natural effects should, as far as possible, be given the same causes

Their wordsTherefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.
Our reading
Never give up the evidence of experiments for dreams and fictions of our own devising

Their wordsWe are certainly not to relinquish the evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and vain fictions of our own devising; nor are we to recede from the analogy of Nature, which uses to be simple, and always consonant to itself.
Our reading
Conclusions drawn by induction from phenomena stand until new phenomena correct them, whatever hypotheses are imagined against them

Their wordsIn experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from phænomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phænomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.

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