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Human, All Too Human (1878; Alexander Harvey translation, 1908)

Friedrich Nietzsche · c. 1878

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Friedrich Nietzsche did not write this page.

Every claim below was made in this book, quoted word for word and numbered in the order the piece makes them, so you can read it there rather than take our word for it. The book prints chapter headings its extracted text does not preserve, so the claims below are in the book's order but not grouped. The sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording. Each quote was checked against a stored copy of the page at build time; where the two differ, the quote is the fact.

  1. Yet everything evolved: there are no eternal facts as there are no absolute truths. Accordingly, historical philosophising is henceforth indispensable, and with it honesty of judgment.
  2. It is the characteristic of an advanced civilization to set a higher value upon little, simple truths, ascertained by scientific method, than upon the pleasing and magnificent errors originating in metaphysical and æsthetical epochs and peoples.
  3. Even were the existence of such a world absolutely established, it would nevertheless remain incontrovertible that of all kinds of knowledge, knowledge of such a world would be of least consequence—of even less consequence than knowledge of the chemical analysis of water would be to a storm tossed mariner.
  4. At the same time, it should be further explained that the needs which religion satisfies and which science must now satisfy, are not immutable. Even they can be diminished and uprooted.
  5. Therefore: only because man deems himself free, but not because he is free, does he experience remorse and the stings of conscience.
  6. No one is responsible for his acts, no one for his nature; to judge is tantamount to being unjust.
  7. Without the errors involved in the assumptions of ethics, man would have remained an animal.
  8. Justice is therefore reprisal and exchange upon the basis of an approximate equality of power.
  9. To contemplate oneself as a complete personality and bear the welfare of that personality in mind in all that one does—this is productive of better results than any sympathetic susceptibility and conduct in behalf of others.
  10. To be moral, virtuous, praiseworthy means to yield obedience to ancient law and hereditary usage.
  11. Morality results from compulsion, it is indeed itself one long compulsion to which obedience is rendered in order that pain may be avoided.
  12. Between good and bad actions there is no difference in kind but, at most, in degree. Good acts are sublimated evil.
  13. Many acts are called bad that are only stupid, because the degree of intelligence that decided for them was low.
  14. For all religions grew out of dread or necessity, and came into existence through an error of the reason.
  15. The aim of religious worship is to influence nature to human advantage, and hence to instil a subjection to law into her that originally she has not, whereas at present man desires to find out the subjection to law of nature in order to guide himself thereby.
  16. Christianity arose to lighten the heart, but now it must first make the heart heavy in order to be able to lighten it afterwards. Christianity will consequently go down.
  17. The agreeable opinion is accepted as true. This is the testimony of pleasure (or as the church says, the evidence of strength) of which all religions are so proud, although they should all be ashamed of it.
  18. The holy person also makes his lot easier through the complete surrender of his life personality and it is all delusion to admire such a phenomenon as the loftiest heroism of morality.

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