korrents

korrents · video

Breach Disclosure Blow-by-Blow: Here's Why It's so Hard

Troy Hunt · 1h 15m · youtube.com ↗

12 korrents from this recording

1h
Troy Hunt did not write this page.

Every claim below is a statement made in this recording, quoted word for word and linked to the second it was said, so you can hear it rather than take our word for it. The wording comes from the transcript published alongside the recording; the sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording.

  1. 0:00:21 · watch on youtube.com↗

    I want people to share the pain that I feel. Not because I want to put you all through it, but because I want people to understand how difficult this thing is at the moment.
  2. 4 min later
  3. 0:04:34 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Very often these will include the password because if they include the password, it gives the victim that much more confidence, if you like, in the legitimacy of the message
  4. 4 min later
  5. 0:08:30 · watch on youtube.com↗

    if it was on a responsible site such as uh I don't know, tryhackme.com, like that, we would have a security.txt file here with all the contact information, so that when someone like me finds their data spread out over the internet, they can get in touch with someone.
  6. 1 min later
  7. 0:09:01 · watch on youtube.com↗

    It's like lawyers are normally enough of a problem when disclosing a data breach, let alone disclosing a data breach to a site which by design is full of lawyers.
  8. 6 min later
  9. 0:15:19 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Cuz remember, like the the problem we're dealing with here is we know assuming that this incident is legitimate, we know that their customers are being targeted with scams. So, to me, that's like a fairly serious thing.
  10. 2 min later
  11. 0:17:36 · watch on youtube.com↗

    You know what they should write on avvo.com? How to actually make it easy for someone to get in touch with you if you are the victim of a data breach.
  12. 6 min later
  13. 0:24:02 · watch on youtube.com↗

    often people go out and they find people on LinkedIn and then they try and get in touch with them. And it shouldn't be this hard. It really shouldn't be this hard.
  14. 38 min later
  15. 1:02:08 · watch on youtube.com↗

    And the reason I do this is that there is a much greater likelihood of someone who signed up to Have I Been Pwned 2 weeks ago remembering what this funny-named service is than someone who signed up 2 years ago uh or even 8 years ago.
  16. 3 min later
  17. 1:04:48 · watch on youtube.com↗

    possibly just recognizing that we need to do much much better at this. As an industry, we have to do better at being receptive to receiving disclosures like this.
  18. 3 min later
  19. 1:07:50 · watch on youtube.com↗

    The point is that these are disposable public email addresses. So, anyone who has an account on mailinator has no expectation whatsoever of privacy.
  20. 1 min later
  21. 1:08:50 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Now, often services will say this regardless of whether that email address exists in their service or not because they're trying to avoid enumeration risks. Enumeration being the ability to ask a service via feature such as password reset whether the email address exists or not.
  22. 5 min later
  23. 1:13:31 · watch on youtube.com↗

    What are the chances that there is data floating around there where randomly selected email addresses from that data set already exist on the service that the data is alleged to have come from? Well, there's one very, very likely explanation for that, which is, well, they just already have accounts.