Security vs. Surveillance

Bruce Schneier · 1 Feb 2016

Bruce Schneier did not write this page.

Every claim below was made in this piece, quoted word for word and numbered in the order the piece makes them, so you can read it there rather than take our word for it. The sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording. Each quote was checked against a stored copy of the page at build time; where the two differ, the quote is the fact.

Our reading
An access mechanism built for the police cannot be limited to the police, so a backdoor weakens the system against every attacker at once.

Their wordsAs technologists, we can’t build an access system that only works for people of a certain citizenship, or with a particular morality, or only in the presence of a specified legal document.
Our reading
The encryption argument is not security against privacy, it is more security against less security.

Their wordsWe’re not being asked to choose between security and privacy. We’re being asked to choose between less security and more security.
Our reading
Widespread encryption protects far more against bulk surveillance than against a targeted attacker.

Their wordsUbiquitous encryption protects us much more from bulk surveillance than from targeted surveillance.
Our reading
Against a sufficiently skilled and determined attacker computer security fails, and most people are safe only because nobody bothered with them.

Their wordsIf a sufficiently skilled, funded, and motivated attacker wants in to your computer, they’re in.

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The other pieces are the ones whose claims are worded most like this one's. That measures language, not agreement: they may argue the opposite.