Read the piece on secondbest.ca ↗
Every claim below was made in this piece, quoted word for word and numbered in the order the piece makes them, so you can read it there rather than take our word for it. The sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording. Each quote was checked against a stored copy of the page at build time; where the two differ, the quote is the fact.
Their wordsI consider the case for frontier AI models having some form of consciousness or subjective experience to be quite strong.
Our reading
Consciousness belongs only to simulations, not to the physical brains or computers running them.
Their wordsneither brains nor computers are conscious, as only simulations can be conscious.
Their wordsvalences like pain and pleasure have a natural account as motivational backstops for inner-aligning RL agents capable of mesa-optimization
Keep reading
The other pieces are the ones whose claims are worded most like this one's. That measures language, not agreement: they may argue the opposite.