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Why is Consciousness So Hard to Explain?

Philip Goff · 44m · youtube.com ↗

17 korrents from this recording

Philip Goff did not write this page.

Every claim below is a statement made in this recording, quoted word for word and linked to the second it was said, so you can hear it rather than take our word for it. The wording comes from the transcript published alongside the recording; the sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording.

  1. 0:33 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Um how I how I think about the problem of consciousness, why I think it's such a unique problem, and why I think just doing science isn't enough, although of course the science is incredibly crucial.
  2. 3 min later
  3. 3:06 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So, my claim is that phenomenal concepts are transparent, like the concept of sphericity, like the concept of a party,
  4. 1 min later
  5. 4:04 · watch on youtube.com↗

    I think it is trivial, but I think the kind of physicalist view Papineau defends for example requires denying that.
  6. 1 min later
  7. 5:33 · watch on youtube.com↗

    But with consciousness, I think to in the in the nuanced I hope way I've just articulated, we have a significant grasp of what it essentially is before we do the science.
  8. 1 min later
  9. 6:22 · watch on youtube.com↗

    I just think we're not even at first base until we get clear on that and I think that's a large reason we're not making progress.
  10. 1 min later
  11. 7:19 · watch on youtube.com↗

    They're not generally thought to be physically dangerous or addictive and so it's sort of ridiculous that they're classed as type A drugs in the UK alongside heroin and cocaine, but I think they are can be psychologically dangerous.
  12. 7:33 · watch on youtube.com↗

    They tear apart our ordinary ways of thinking and often those ordinary ways of thinking are important for psychological stability
  13. 13 min later
  14. 20:03 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So, if we want if we if we want to avoid skepticism about the external world, we have to accept something like this.
  15. 5 min later
  16. 25:04 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So, I think if we're going to have a defeater here, we've got to have an established empirical case that it's causing a hallucination rather than doing the other thing, just kind of shutting down my conscious mind.
  17. 2 min later
  18. 26:50 · watch on youtube.com↗

    I think, you know quantum entanglement is strong evidence for some kind of radical unity at the fundamental level
  19. 2 min later
  20. 29:19 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So, to be clear with what I am claiming, if you are a physicalist and you have this experience, I think it's perfectly rational to say that was a hallucination.
  21. 2 min later
  22. 31:07 · watch on youtube.com↗

    I think lots of panpsychists are going to be very skeptical of this. I But I want to say they shouldn't be.
  23. 3 min later
  24. 33:43 · watch on youtube.com↗

    if my belief in panpsychism is justified and I have this experience where it you know it really seems to be the case what the experience reveals then I think it's rational for me to trust that because I think there's no defeater.
  25. 2 min later
  26. 36:02 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So, that's why yeah, I just get completely lost with externalism. It's why I I have more internalist intuitions, although that wasn't much of an argument what I just said.
  27. 4 min later
  28. 40:31 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Hume's view about testimony that, you know, you can't believe testimony, you've got to establish that this is a a credent um a well um a support a support a source of testimony that's got things right largely every time. I think it's completely unrealistic.
  29. 40:58 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So, I think we do have to have some sort of default. Again, it's not a free-for-all cuz of the defeater clause, but some sort of default for trusting testimony.
  30. 2 min later
  31. 42:35 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So, physicalists in the audience, I don't think you should believe me. Um Or at least there's a Yeah. Let me just put it that way. But if you're a panpsychist, and I I think you unless you think there's some good reason I'm lying or something, I think you should believe me.