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Discussion between Lisa Feldman Barrett and Mark Solms on the nature of emotion (Part 1)

Lisa Feldman Barrett · 1h 32m · youtube.com ↗

26 korrents from this recording

1h
Lisa Feldman Barrett did not write this page.

Every claim below is a statement made in this recording, quoted word for word and linked to the second it was said, so you can hear it rather than take our word for it. The wording comes from the transcript published alongside the recording; the sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording.

  1. 0:01:02 · watch on youtube.com↗

    And I just want to also mention that it's really rare for two scientists to speak to each other in advance of a critique like this. And I would also say, it's very rare for scientists who disagree with each other, to talk to each other at all, sometimes.
  2. 8 min later
  3. 0:09:19 · watch on youtube.com↗

    And popular science books, as you know, Mark, are not the same thing as the scientific research that supports those books. What I mean by that is, we use metaphors.
  4. 0:09:38 · watch on youtube.com↗

    And as you know, all metaphors are wrong. And what we do in science writing is we try to pick the metaphor that's least wrong for our purposes, that does the least violence or that impacts the validity of the statements, the least
  5. 2 min later
  6. 0:12:01 · watch on youtube.com↗

    that brains evolved, it seems, evolved in concert with the growth of the size and complexity of bodies, and one of their most important jobs is regulating the state of the body, modeling the state of the body and regulating the state of the body.
  7. 0:12:24 · watch on youtube.com↗

    And the most metabolically efficient way to do that is predictively. So the brain is always regulating the body and coordinating all the systems, and the body is sending signals back to the brain, which the brain uses to confirm or correct its model of the current sensory state of the body.
  8. 1 min later
  9. 0:13:04 · watch on youtube.com↗

    And interoception, we're not, we are not particularly wired to have very precise sensations have interoceptive events in the body.
  10. 2 min later
  11. 0:14:54 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So just like brightness and loudness are properties of consciousness, affect is also a property of consciousness. So feeling, you know, pleasant or unpleasant, comfortable, uncomfortable, worked up or calm.
  12. 1 min later
  13. 0:15:36 · watch on youtube.com↗

    But I never said, I might have said valence and arousal and left other features of affect unspecified, but I don't think I've ever said that it's only valence and arousal, because the data don't support that view. There are other features of affect, like a feeling of effort.
  14. 4 min later
  15. 0:20:03 · watch on youtube.com↗

    But there are definable criteria for natural kind categories. And I don't think emotions meet those criteria under any, any, by anybody's research actually.
  16. 0:20:22 · watch on youtube.com↗

    because actually, the theory of constructed emotion is a constructionist view that certainly has elements of social construction, but it also has elements of psychological construction and neural construction.
  17. 1 min later
  18. 0:21:11 · watch on youtube.com↗

    the infant's brain is wired, according to... Brains wire themselves to their world, and the world is curated for infants by their caregivers.
  19. 4 min later
  20. 0:25:10 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So basically, predictions are concepts. They're not, concepts don't trigger predictions. Predictions are concepts, they're groups of concepts. Sorry, concepts are groups of predictions that are similar to each other in some way.
  21. 9 min later
  22. 0:33:42 · watch on youtube.com↗

    you don't need a word to have a concept, but you do need to have... your brain has to be able to make the concept in order to have the experience.
  23. 1 min later
  24. 0:35:01 · watch on youtube.com↗

    It's just that words are super useful ways to learn abstract concepts, to learn concepts where the instances might differ in their sensory and motor features.
  25. 1 min later
  26. 0:36:02 · watch on youtube.com↗

    but even in a two hour old larval zebrafish, those reflexes are not executed in an obligatory punctate way.
  27. 1 min later
  28. 0:36:56 · watch on youtube.com↗

    which is why in fear, sometimes you run away, sometimes you freeze, sometimes you fight, sometimes you cry. In Bali, people fall asleep. There's no specific sensory motor pattern for an abstract concept, which is what I think emotions are.
  29. 7 min later
  30. 0:44:14 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So you are always in a state where an affect is relevant to consciousness. Sometimes it's in the foreground. And sometimes it's in the background, but it's always there, in cognition and in perception.
  31. 2 min later
  32. 0:45:57 · watch on youtube.com↗

    but I don't think there's one qualia for disgust. For example, there are instances of disgust where people are feeling very pleasant. There are instances where they feel unpleasant. Same thing for fear, there are instances of pleasant fear, there are instances of unpleasant fear.
  33. 0:46:23 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So my point is that it's not that everything is the same, it's that there's variation, I would say, within a category. And there's also similarity across categories. Which means the boundaries aren't firm.
  34. 12 min later
  35. 0:57:53 · watch on youtube.com↗

    I think, for example, affect, valence is innate, probably, I don't think you have to teach an infant, what is pleasant and what is unpleasant. So, but um, I don't think that anger, sadness, fear, and so on constitute categories, distinct categories of affect in the way that you mean them.
  36. 3 min later
  37. 1:00:31 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So, I don't, based on my understanding of the anatomy, and also on the functional dynamics in the brain, I don't think there you can even make a very strong claim about there being separate interoceptive and exteroceptive processing.
  38. 4 min later
  39. 1:04:08 · watch on youtube.com↗

    So you can take, what they do is they take a lot of detailed signals and compress them into lower dimensional summaries. That's what I think affect is. It's a compression, it's a lower dimensional representation. Not that one thing is triggering another.
  40. 6 min later
  41. 1:10:29 · watch on youtube.com↗

    there are many, many, many cases where people feel pain when there is no ascending nociceptive signal. That's chronic pain. And there are also cases where people, there is tissue damage, and, there are nociceptive signals, and people do not feel pain.
  42. 4 min later
  43. 1:14:46 · watch on youtube.com↗

    I don't think there's a one to one correspondence between the qualia as you would say that people experience and the biological signals that are occurring under the hood. And I also think there's evidence, there's really good evidence that, that these qualia are continuous, they're not discrete.
  44. 14 min later
  45. 1:29:08 · watch on youtube.com↗

    You observe behaviors in animals and you make an inference. It's your subjective inference.
  46. 1 min later
  47. 1:30:27 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Because nobody has ever discovered chemically, anatomically, anything, precise boundaries in circuitry. They're basically, it's just like in systems theory, you as the scientist decide what's in the system and what's outside the system.