korrents

korrents · Lex Fridman Podcast · #470

James Holland: World War II, Hitler, Churchill, Stalin & Biggest Battles | Lex Fridman Podcast #470

James Holland · 3h 24m · youtube.com ↗

27 korrents from this recording

1h2h3h
James Holland did not write this page.

Every claim below is a statement made in this recording, quoted word for word and linked to the second it was said, so you can hear it rather than take our word for it. The wording comes from the transcript published alongside the recording; the sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording.

  1. 0:18:10 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Operation Barbarossa should never have come close to being a victory; the Germans got as far as they did because of Red Army and Soviet incompetence, not German prowess.

    Their wordsI mean, it is largely down to incompetence of the Red Army and the Soviet leadership in the summer of 1941 that they get as far as they do. I mean, Barbarossa should never have come close to being a victory.
    Interesting
  2. 4 min later

  3. 0:21:59 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    A large army is inherently impractical and inefficient: every extra soldier is another mouth to feed and one fewer worker making the tanks and shells.

    Their wordsWhereas, there’s also another point, which is having large armies is actually inherently impractical and inefficient, because the larger the army, the more people you’ve got to feed, the more barracks you’ve got to have, the more space you’ve got to have for training, the more people you’re taking out of your workforce to produce tanks and shells, and all the rest of it, because they’re tramping around with rifles.
    Interesting
  4. 2 min later

  5. 0:23:41 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    On the scale of Barbarossa the operational level of war decides everything: it does not matter how good your commanders at the front are if the backup is not there.

    Their wordsSo when you’re talking about Operation Barbarossa, to go back to your original question, Lex, you’re dealing with an operation on such a vast scale, that that operational level of war is absolutely vital to its chances of success or failure. It doesn’t matter how good your individual commanders are at the front. If you haven’t got the backup, it’s not going to work.
    Interesting
  6. 1 min later

  7. 0:24:15 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    The phrase Nazi war machine is a misnomer: only the spearhead of the German army was mechanised and industrialised, and the rest of it was nothing of the kind.

    Their wordsSo people always talk about the Nazi war machine. In a way, it’s a kind of misnomer, because you’re sort of suggesting that it’s highly mechanized and industrialized, and all the rest of it. And nothing could be further from the truth. The spearhead is, but the rest of it is not.
    Interesting
  8. 11 min later

  9. 0:35:00 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    The fall of France in 1940 was half German operational brilliance and half French failure and incompetence.

    Their wordsI mean, the reason why France is subdued in 1940 is 50% brilliance of the Germans and their operational art in that particular instance, and 50% French failure really, and incompetence.
    Interesting
  10. 4 min later

  11. 0:39:06 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    France was so traumatised by the First World War that it became risk averse, and by being risk averse it took a far greater risk.

    Their wordsThere is just no stomach to do that again. So that makes them risk averse. And by being risk averse, you’re actually taking a far greater risk. That’s the irony of it.
    Interesting
  12. 5 min later

  13. 0:44:30 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    If anyone in the Nazi leadership was a genius it was Goebbels the propaganda chief, not Hitler.

    Their wordsAnd you were talking about the genius of war. It’s not Hitler that’s a genius. If anyone’s a genius, it’s Goebbels, the propaganda chief.
    Interesting

  15. 0:44:30 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Radio is central to the whole story of Nazi Germany: in 1939 no country in the world, the United States included, had a denser radio network.

    Their wordsAnd I think radios are really, really key to the whole story because there is no denser radio network anywhere in the world, including the United States, than Germany in 1939.
    Interesting
  16. 8 min later

  17. 0:52:34 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    History does not repeat itself, but patterns of human behaviour do, and what always follows an economic crisis is political upheaval.

    Their wordsAnd this is why I say that history doesn’t repeat itself. Of course it doesn’t. It can’t possibly repeat itself because we’re always living in a constantly evolving time. But patterns of human behaviour do. And what you always get after economic crisis is political upheaval, always, always, always.
    Interesting
  18. 24 min later

  19. 1:16:33 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Chamberlain's choice at Munich was understandable rather than craven: no democratic leader in 1938 could have taken his country to war against 92% of its population.

    Their wordsBut Chamberlain was prime minister in a democracy, a parliamentary democracy, where 92% of the population were against going to war in 1938. There was not a single democratic leader in the world that would go against the wishes of 92% of the population.
    Interesting
  20. 13 min later

  21. 1:29:49 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    The familiar narrative of the war — useless Britain, the world's best German army beaten only because Hitler was mad — is an artefact of how the world looked in the 1970s and 1980s, not of how it looked in 1939.

    Their wordsAnd so, one of the reasons why you have this narrative that Britain was a bit rubbish and hanging on the shirttails of the Americans and all the blood was spilt in eastern front and Germany had the best army in the world and was only defeated because Hitler was mad and blah, blah, blah, that kind of traditional narrative, that narrative emerges through the prism of what was going on in the 1970s and what was going on in the 1980s and the changing world, rather than looking at it through the prism of the late 1930s or early 1940s.
    Interesting
  22. 9 min later

  23. 1:38:39 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Britain and France's refusal to negotiate seriously with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939 was the great missed opportunity to snooker the Third Reich.

    Their wordsI mean, if ever there is, I think, a mistake that’s Britain and France should’ve been a bit more into realpolitiks than they were. It’s such an opportunity to ensure that, to snooker the Third Reich, and they don’t take it.
    Interesting
  24. 6 min later

  25. 1:45:00 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    From the moment Hitler took power in 1933 a war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was inevitable; only which of them would fire first was undecided.

    Their wordsI think whoever fired first was not decided at that point, but I do think that from the moment that Hitler takes power in 1933, a conflict between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany is inevitable.
    Interesting
  26. 9 min later

  27. 1:53:37 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Calling Churchill the chief warmonger of the Second World War is ludicrous.

    Their wordsAnd I think by saying that Churchill is the chief warmonger of the Second World War, I think, is ludicrous.
    Interesting

  29. 1:53:37 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Allied bombing and the Holocaust are not morally equivalent: had Hitler stopped the war the bombing would have stopped, while a German victory would only have accelerated the killing.

    Their wordsIt’s like, no, because the moment Hitler stopped the war, the bombing would stop. The moment the war stopped in Hitler’s favor, the killing would continue and be accelerated.
    Interesting
  30. 2 min later

  31. 1:56:03 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Hitler was always going to invade the Soviet Union unless the Soviet Union struck first; no Allied decision forced that war on him.

    Their wordsWell, no, because Hitler was always going to invade the Soviet Union unless the Soviet Union invaded Germany first. So that was always going to happen.
    Interesting
  32. 7 min later

  33. 2:02:48 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    The Western Allies fought with steel rather than flesh: no more than 14 to 15% of an Allied army was infantry, and 45% of it was service troops.

    Their wordsYet actually they’re a comparatively small proportion of the army. So no more than 14 to 15% of any army, Allied army, is infantry. 45% are service corps, service troops, driving trucks and cooks and bottle washers and people lugging great big boxes of stuff.
    Interesting
  34. 4 min later

  35. 2:06:28 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Decapitate a strong leader without a solution for the power vacuum and bad elements sweep in very quickly — a lesson of the Second World War that Iraq ignored.

    Their wordsI think there are so many lessons from World War II that could have been brought into the history of the last 30 years, which weren’t, such as if you decapitate an incredibly strong leader, you get a power vacuum. And if you don’t have a solution for that power vacuum, lots of bad elements are going to sweep into that in very quick order, which of course, is exactly what happens in Iraq.
    Interesting
  36. 17 min later

  37. 2:23:36 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    The Few were Britain's first line of defence in 1940, not its last; the story that they alone stood between Britain and the Nazi hordes is rubbish.

    Their wordsWell, everyone always says, the few were the last line of defense against the Nazi hordes and all this kind of stuff, and it’s all rubbish. They’re the first line of defense.
    Interesting
  38. 2 min later

  39. 2:26:04 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Britain out-produced Germany in single-engine fighters right through the Battle of Britain, by two to one even in the Germans' best month.

    Their wordsAnd by that time, aircraft production in Britain is massively outpacing the Germans and the best ratio that the Germans achieve in 1940s, July 1940, when the British produced 496 new Hurricanes and Spitfires, single-engine fighters, and the Germans only produced 240 single-engine fighters.
    Interesting
  40. 5 min later

  41. 2:31:33 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Generalship and bravery can move the Second World War by months, but it was a war of numbers, and past a certain point its outcome was already inevitable.

    Their wordsBut ultimately, there’s a certain point in the Second World War where the outcome is absolutely inevitable because the guys that lose can’t compete with the numbers that the guys are going to win.
    Interesting
  42. 4 min later

  43. 2:35:18 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    The decisive fact about the Tiger tank is that there were 36 Shermans built for every one of them.

    Their wordsBut the main fact of all is of 1,347 Tigers built, there were 49,000 Shermans. So that means there’s 36 Shermans to every single Tiger.
    Interesting
  44. 2 min later

  45. 2:37:14 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    German tank design lost sight of what makes a tank good: a big gun and thick armour matter less than ease of maintenance and reliability.

    Their wordsBut actually what conflict in World War II shows you is that you need more than that. You need ease of maintenance, you need reliability.
    Interesting
  46. 6 min later

  47. 2:43:23 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Germany had already lost the war by the beginning of December 1941, once one enemy had become three in six months.

    Their wordsAnd I think you can argue and argue convincingly that by, let’s say, beginning of December 1941, Germany is just not going to win, it just can’t.
    Interesting
  48. 3 min later

  49. 2:46:27 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    Hitler had no business directing the German war: an enormous memory for units on a map is not the training a commander needs, and he had never been to staff college.

    Their wordsHe might have amazing attention to detail, he might be able to understand, have an enormous capacity to remember units and where they are on a map, but he was only a half corporal in the First World war. He’s never been to staff college.
    Interesting
  50. 5 min later

  51. 2:51:05 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    It was not the street fighting in Stalingrad that destroyed the German Sixth Army, it was the encirclement that followed.

    Their wordsAnd Russians will hate me for saying this, and I probably will get a whole load of bots on the back of it, but the truth is, it is not the street fighting that destroys Sixth Army, it is the encirclement, the subsequent encirclement.
    Interesting
  52. 24 min later

  53. 3:15:22 · watch on youtube.com↗

    Our reading

    D-Day is remembered as a predominantly American show, but all three service commanders were British and two-thirds of the aircraft and of the men landed were British and Dominion.

    Their wordsAnd while it is still seen as a predominantly American show, all three service commanders are British. Two-thirds of the aircraft are British. Two-thirds of the men landed are British and Dominion.
    Interesting