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← Emotions are functional states, to be understood by what they do…
17 connected korrents · 11 moments from 2 Nov 2004 to 18 Sept 2026.
Everything filed under AI sentience
AI sentience
Everything filed under AGI
AGI
Everything filed under consciousness
consciousness Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Read this korrent: Emotions are functional states, to be understood by what they do rather than by how any particular brain or machine happens to implement them. Emotions are functional states, to be understood by what they do rather than by how any particular brain or machine happens to implement them. Last stated 2 months ago
17 Aug 2026
RA
Ralph Adolphs — holds since 2026-08-17 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Functionally defined emotions can be attributed to animals and, to some extent, to AI systems, without any claim about what either of them feels. — tap to centre the map on it Functionally defined emotions can be attributed to animals and, to some extent, to AI systems, without any claim about what either of them feels. Last stated 2 months ago
17 Aug 2026
RA
Ralph Adolphs — holds since 2026-08-17 — tap for who they are
Same subject: An emotion is a fan-in, fan-out architecture: many different signals converge on one central state, out of which many different behaviours can follow. — tap to centre the map on it An emotion is a fan-in, fan-out architecture: many different signals converge on one central state, out of which many different behaviours can follow. Last stated 2 months ago
17 Aug 2026
RA
Ralph Adolphs — holds since 2026-08-17 — tap for who they are
Same subject: The famous body maps of emotion record where people believe they would feel things, not where anything in the body actually changes. — tap to centre the map on it The famous body maps of emotion record where people believe they would feel things, not where anything in the body actually changes. Last stated 2 months ago
17 Aug 2026
RA
Ralph Adolphs — holds since 2026-08-17 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Most emotional pathology is not a problem with the emotion itself but with the ability to regulate it. — tap to centre the map on it Most emotional pathology is not a problem with the emotion itself but with the ability to regulate it. Last stated 2 months ago
17 Aug 2026
RA
Ralph Adolphs — holds since 2026-08-17 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Thoughts, feelings, decisions and bodies are not real in themselves, only useful abstractions layered over the underlying chaos of atoms. — tap to centre the map on it Thoughts, feelings, decisions and bodies are not real in themselves, only useful abstractions layered over the underlying chaos of atoms. Last stated 4 months ago
24 Jun 2026
JB
Jamie Brandon — holds since 2026-06-24 — tap for who they are
Same subject: You do not need a word for an emotion in order to regulate it: a concept you cannot put into language still gives you purchase on it. — tap to centre the map on it You do not need a word for an emotion in order to regulate it: a concept you cannot put into language still gives you purchase on it. Last stated 2 months ago
17 Aug 2026
RA
Ralph Adolphs — holds since 2026-08-17 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Each emotion probably does have a specific bodily signature; the studies that found none measured far too little of the body to have seen it. — tap to centre the map on it Each emotion probably does have a specific bodily signature; the studies that found none measured far too little of the body to have seen it. Last stated 2 months ago
17 Aug 2026
RA
Ralph Adolphs — holds since 2026-08-17 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Feelings people are told not to feel are stored inside, and a later loss can make them break down. — tap to centre the map on it Feelings people are told not to feel are stored inside, and a later loss can make them break down. Last stated 22 years ago
2 Nov 2004
LG
Leslie Greenberg — holds since 2004-11-02 — tap for who they are
Same subject: AI sentience is a category error, and the chances of AIs being sentient are vanishingly small. — tap to centre the map on it AI sentience is a category error, and the chances of AIs being sentient are vanishingly small. Last stated 2 months ago
31 Aug 2026
TC
Tyler Cowen — holds since 2026-08-31 — tap for who they are
Same subject: An AI's sympathy and a friend's are not the same act: one is a learned pattern about what to say, the other rests on having felt the thing. — tap to centre the map on it An AI's sympathy and a friend's are not the same act: one is a learned pattern about what to say, the other rests on having felt the thing. Last stated 2 months ago
10 Aug 2026
FL
Fei-Fei Li — holds since 2026-08-10 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Calling an intelligent, self-aware being legal property does not resolve whether it has an interest in freedom. — tap to centre the map on it Calling an intelligent, self-aware being legal property does not resolve whether it has an interest in freedom. Last stated 3 months ago
24 Jul 2026
PS
Peter Singer — holds since 2026-07-24 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A mystical state defies expression, so its quality must be experienced directly and cannot be passed on to others — tap to centre the map on it A mystical state defies expression, so its quality must be experienced directly and cannot be passed on to others
WJ
William James — holds since c. 1902 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A person is best understood as a loose jumble of barely intelligent, looping processes producing only the illusion of coherent subjectivity. — tap to centre the map on it A person is best understood as a loose jumble of barely intelligent, looping processes producing only the illusion of coherent subjectivity. Last stated a month ago
18 Sept 2026
MW
Matt Webb — holds since 2026-09-18 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A sense of coherent consciousness arises from experience being compressed into a single thread rather than from the brain's full underlying activity. — tap to centre the map on it A sense of coherent consciousness arises from experience being compressed into a single thread rather than from the brain's full underlying activity. Last stated 9 months ago
4 Feb 2026
SW
Stephen Wolfram — holds since 2026-02-04 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A country outside the AI supply chain should just buy the index — which works only in the world where AI ends up commoditised rather than concentrated. — tap to centre the map on it A country outside the AI supply chain should just buy the index — which works only in the world where AI ends up commoditised rather than concentrated. Last stated 5 months ago
4 Jun 2026
AI
Alex Imas — holds since 2026-06-04 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A human being is not an AGI: we lack a huge amount of knowledge and rely on continual learning instead, so continual learning is what superintelligence should mean. — tap to centre the map on it A human being is not an AGI: we lack a huge amount of knowledge and rely on continual learning instead, so continual learning is what superintelligence should mean. Last stated 11 months ago
25 Nov 2025
IS
Ilya Sutskever — holds since 2025-11-25 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A language model is no substitute for a well-specified conventional algorithm, so it cannot simply be dropped into a complex problem and trusted. — tap to centre the map on it A language model is no substitute for a well-specified conventional algorithm, so it cannot simply be dropped into a complex problem and trusted. Last stated a year ago
7 Jun 2025
GM
Gary Marcus — holds since 2025-06-07 — tap for who they are
At the centre
Emotions are functional states, to be understood by what they do rather than by how any particular brain or machine happens to implement them.
Holds Read this korrent →
Functionally defined emotions can be attributed to animals and, to some extent, to AI systems, without any claim about what either of them feels.
Holds
An emotion is a fan-in, fan-out architecture: many different signals converge on one central state, out of which many different behaviours can follow.
Holds
The famous body maps of emotion record where people believe they would feel things, not where anything in the body actually changes.
Holds
Most emotional pathology is not a problem with the emotion itself but with the ability to regulate it.
Holds
Thoughts, feelings, decisions and bodies are not real in themselves, only useful abstractions layered over the underlying chaos of atoms.
Holds
You do not need a word for an emotion in order to regulate it: a concept you cannot put into language still gives you purchase on it.
Holds
Each emotion probably does have a specific bodily signature; the studies that found none measured far too little of the body to have seen it.
Holds
Feelings people are told not to feel are stored inside, and a later loss can make them break down.
Holds
AI sentience is a category error, and the chances of AIs being sentient are vanishingly small.
Holds
An AI's sympathy and a friend's are not the same act: one is a learned pattern about what to say, the other rests on having felt the thing.
Holds
Calling an intelligent, self-aware being legal property does not resolve whether it has an interest in freedom.
Holds
A mystical state defies expression, so its quality must be experienced directly and cannot be passed on to others
Last stated c. 1902
Holds
A person is best understood as a loose jumble of barely intelligent, looping processes producing only the illusion of coherent subjectivity.
Holds
A sense of coherent consciousness arises from experience being compressed into a single thread rather than from the brain's full underlying activity.
Holds
A country outside the AI supply chain should just buy the index — which works only in the world where AI ends up commoditised rather than concentrated.
Holds
A human being is not an AGI: we lack a huge amount of knowledge and rely on continual learning instead, so continual learning is what superintelligence should mean.
Holds
A language model is no substitute for a well-specified conventional algorithm, so it cannot simply be dropped into a complex problem and trusted.
Holds