korrents

korrents · papers

Chaos and Misallocation under Price Controls (with 2 co-authors)

Alex Tabarrok · 12 Feb 2026 · arxiv.org

4 korrents from this paper

In plain words

When prices are frozen below market levels, sellers become indifferent about where to ship, so tiny cost differences send all supply to some markets and starve others completely. That feast-or-famine pattern creates losses from goods going to the wrong places that range from roughly one to nine times the usual loss from simply having less overall, calibrated to the 1973-74 U.S. gasoline crisis. It proves all-or-nothing outcomes are the normal result under price ceilings and gives bounds on the waste without assuming demand shapes, going past the standard quantity-loss measure and random-allocation benchmarks.

Our summary of the paper, not the authors' words — written to be readable without the field's vocabulary, from the stored copy of the paper and nothing else. Drafted with xai:grok-4.5 and checked by a person. The authors' own sentences are the quotes below.

Near this, by wording

Papers whose claims are worded most like this one's, found by the same hourly pass that draws the map. It is a measure of LANGUAGE, not of agreement or of citation: two papers can be near each other here and flatly contradict one another.

Alex Tabarrok did not write this page.

Every claim below was made in this piece, quoted word for word and numbered in the order the piece makes them, so you can read it there rather than take our word for it. The sentence above each quote is our reading of the claim, not their wording. Each quote was checked against a stored copy of the page at build time; where the two differ, the quote is the fact.

  1. These corner allocations create a distinct source of cross-market misallocation, separate from the aggregate quantity loss (the Harberger triangle) and from within-market misallocation emphasized in prior work.
  2. This paper shows that feast or famine, not modest belt-tightening, is the generic outcome of price controls.
  3. We show that equilibrium generically occurs at neither the Harberger nor Glaeser-Luttmer benchmark. Cost-minimizing suppliers drive allocations to vertices, not interiors. Corners are not an assumption but an outcome about what cost-minimizing suppliers choose. The correct benchmark is corners, not random, and corners generate qualitatively different welfare properties: losses far larger than either efficient or random distributions, and discontinuous jumps from small parameter perturbations.
  4. The quantity reduction is not the main cost of price controls. The misallocation is.