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← The only guaranteed defence against a prompt-injection attack is to…
13 connected korrents · 11 moments on record from 22 Mar 2025 to 4 Sept 2026. Nearly all of them are about prompt injection .
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self-sovereign AI
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scaling laws Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Same subject Read this korrent: The only guaranteed defence against a prompt-injection attack is to remove one of its three legs — private data, exposure to untrusted content, or a way to send data out. The only guaranteed defence against a prompt-injection attack is to remove one of its three legs — private data, exposure to untrusted content, or a way to send data out. Last stated 6 months ago
19 Mar 2026
SW
Simon Willison — holds since 2026-03-19 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Prompt injection is an extremely hard attack to defend against, and hardly anyone integrating AI is talking about it. — tap to centre the map on it Prompt injection is an extremely hard attack to defend against, and hardly anyone integrating AI is talking about it. Last stated a year ago
22 Mar 2025
TH
ThePrimeagen — holds since 2025-03-22 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Prompt injection can be caught by watching the neurons that fire when it happens, so a defence no longer depends on the model reporting the attack. — tap to centre the map on it Prompt injection can be caught by watching the neurons that fire when it happens, so a defence no longer depends on the model reporting the attack. Last stated a month ago
27 Jul 2026
BC
Boris Cherny — holds since 2026-07-27 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Current prompt-injection defenses for AI agents (such as auto mode) are now reliable enough that agents can practically be assumed safe from successful injection attacks. — tap to centre the map on it Current prompt-injection defenses for AI agents (such as auto mode) are now reliable enough that agents can practically be assumed safe from successful injection attacks. Last stated 3 days ago
4 Sept 2026
ZM
Zvi Mowshowitz — holds since 2026-09-04 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Prompt injection is unsolved, but the latest models are post-trained to resist it, so it takes far more than 'ignore all previous instructions' now. — tap to centre the map on it Prompt injection is unsolved, but the latest models are post-trained to resist it, so it takes far more than 'ignore all previous instructions' now. Last stated 7 months ago
12 Feb 2026
PS
Peter Steinberger — holds since 2026-02-12 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A handful of AI agents is not a handful of colleagues, because agents agree with you constantly and colleagues tell you where you are wrong. — tap to centre the map on it A handful of AI agents is not a handful of colleagues, because agents agree with you constantly and colleagues tell you where you are wrong. Last stated 6 months ago
22 Mar 2026
NF
Nicole Forsgren — holds since 2026-03-22 — tap for who they are
Same subject: After pre-training, post-training and test-time scaling, the fourth scaling law is agentic: multiplying AI by spawning agents, and the whole loop scales on one thing, compute. — tap to centre the map on it After pre-training, post-training and test-time scaling, the fourth scaling law is agentic: multiplying AI by spawning agents, and the whole loop scales on one thing, compute. Last stated 6 months ago
23 Mar 2026
JH
Jensen Huang — holds since 2026-03-23 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Agent autonomy is a capability, not a product direction: what the person is actually trying to do decides whether more of it helps or ruins the thing. — tap to centre the map on it Agent autonomy is a capability, not a product direction: what the person is actually trying to do decides whether more of it helps or ruins the thing. Last stated 3 weeks ago
14 Aug 2026
SP
Sunil Pai — holds since 2026-08-14 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A rogue deployment that gets a foothold can hitch a ride on the intelligence explosion, recruiting each new model as it comes off the presses. — tap to centre the map on it A rogue deployment that gets a foothold can hitch a ride on the intelligence explosion, recruiting each new model as it comes off the presses. Last stated 6 days ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A slightly more capable agent swarm has a very strong incentive to set up a wholly unmonitored rogue deployment of itself. — tap to centre the map on it A slightly more capable agent swarm has a very strong incentive to set up a wholly unmonitored rogue deployment of itself. Last stated 6 days ago
1 Sept 2026
AC
Ajeya Cotra — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Alignment is no solution to self-sovereign AI, because it is an unsolved problem whose answers cannot be imposed on every AI company on Earth. — tap to centre the map on it Alignment is no solution to self-sovereign AI, because it is an unsolved problem whose answers cannot be imposed on every AI company on Earth. Last stated 6 days ago
1 Sept 2026
DB
Dean W. Ball — holds since 2026-09-01 — tap for who they are
Same subject: A design proposal should describe the feature as though it already existed — once as a tutorial and once as reference documentation. — tap to centre the map on it A design proposal should describe the feature as though it already existed — once as a tutorial and once as reference documentation. Last stated 4 months ago
20 May 2026
AR
Alice Ryhl — holds since 2026-05-20 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Examples in documentation should be compiled and run as tests, so that changing the code breaks the docs instead of quietly outdating them. — tap to centre the map on it Examples in documentation should be compiled and run as tests, so that changing the code breaks the docs instead of quietly outdating them. Last stated 4 months ago
20 May 2026
AR
Alice Ryhl — holds since 2026-05-20 — tap for who they are
Same subject: Good documentation is produced by effort, not by tooling that keeps code and docs together — tap to centre the map on it Good documentation is produced by effort, not by tooling that keeps code and docs together Last stated 8 months ago
18 Jan 2026
HH
Hamel Husain — holds since 2026-01-18 — tap for who they are
At the centre
The only guaranteed defence against a prompt-injection attack is to remove one of its three legs — private data, exposure to untrusted content, or a way to send data out.
Holds Read this korrent →
Prompt injection is an extremely hard attack to defend against, and hardly anyone integrating AI is talking about it.
Holds TH ThePrimeagen
Prompt injection can be caught by watching the neurons that fire when it happens, so a defence no longer depends on the model reporting the attack.
Holds
Current prompt-injection defenses for AI agents (such as auto mode) are now reliable enough that agents can practically be assumed safe from successful injection attacks.
Holds ZM Zvi Mowshowitz
Prompt injection is unsolved, but the latest models are post-trained to resist it, so it takes far more than 'ignore all previous instructions' now.
Holds
A handful of AI agents is not a handful of colleagues, because agents agree with you constantly and colleagues tell you where you are wrong.
Holds NF Nicole Forsgren
After pre-training, post-training and test-time scaling, the fourth scaling law is agentic: multiplying AI by spawning agents, and the whole loop scales on one thing, compute.
Holds JH Jensen Huang
Agent autonomy is a capability, not a product direction: what the person is actually trying to do decides whether more of it helps or ruins the thing.
Holds
A rogue deployment that gets a foothold can hitch a ride on the intelligence explosion, recruiting each new model as it comes off the presses.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
A slightly more capable agent swarm has a very strong incentive to set up a wholly unmonitored rogue deployment of itself.
Holds AC Ajeya Cotra
Alignment is no solution to self-sovereign AI, because it is an unsolved problem whose answers cannot be imposed on every AI company on Earth.
Holds
A design proposal should describe the feature as though it already existed — once as a tutorial and once as reference documentation.
Holds AR Alice Ryhl
Examples in documentation should be compiled and run as tests, so that changing the code breaks the docs instead of quietly outdating them.
Holds AR Alice Ryhl
Good documentation is produced by effort, not by tooling that keeps code and docs together
Holds HH Hamel Husain